The MRA v/s Coca-Cola Indian Ocean Islands Ltd [2026 SCJ 31]

The case concerned an application made by the Mauritius Revenue Authority (“MRA”) to appeal to the decision of the Supreme Court of Mauritius dated 9 September 2025 to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (“JCPC”). The Supreme Court in its initial decision referred the case before it back to be determined by the Assessment Review Committee (“ARC”) on the merits.

The MRA, in rebuttal to the stance of the taxpayer, argued that the Supreme Court’s decision met the statutory test of finality and of ‘great general and public importance’ under section 81(2)(a) of the Mauritian Constitution.

It additionally, on the day of the hearing, raised a new argument not forming part of its initial grounds of appeal to the effect that the (now repealed) Rule 8 of the Assessment Review Committee Appeal Rules 2007 (the “ARC Rules”), which provided for the power of the Supreme Court to decide the matter, was ultra vires.

It argued this point on the basis that section 21(2) of the Mauritius Revenue Authority Act (“MRA Act”) only related to the prosecution of appeals, and not the powers of the Supreme Court. The MRA submitted that the law was “deficient” and that the decisions of the Supreme Court in tax cases, whether affirming, reversing or remitting to the ARC, were all ultra vires since their powers were not rooted in statute. The implication of this position, as submitted by the taxpayer, would render the role of the Supreme Court in practice redundant or at best, academic.

Finality

The MRA submitted that the decision that has to be looked at, that is what decision was appealed against, is that of the ARC and not that of the MRA and thereafter contended that the Supreme Court’s judgment was final to the extent that what was appealed against was the decision of the ARC as opposed to the decision of the MRA. It cannot be said that because the matter has not been heard on the merits, this is an interlocutory judgment.

It further argued that the applicable test of finality was that of the “applications approached” rather than “order approach”.

The Supreme Court aptly rectified the MRA’s position on this point as follows:

(i)           the decision subject to the appeal was that of the Supreme Court and not that of the ARC.

(ii)         The applicable test, in line with Mauritius local practice and procedure, as established by the long line of decided cases since 1888, is the order test which is “whether the party had been placed in ‘the impossibility of moving further in the matter’ or even of moving to ‘another tribunal of competent jurisdiction’”.

It thereafter concluded that the decision of the Supreme Court to remit the case back to the ARC was clearly not final and failed to satisfy this fundamental requirement of section 81(2)(a) of the Mauritian constitution. The Supreme Court’s focus on the established procedure and jurisprudence serves as a reminder to all law practitioners that care must be exercised in interpreting cases involving practice in commonwealth jurisdictions and their applicability to the Mauritian context.

While the Supreme Court determined that the non-satisfaction of the finality requirement was enough to dispose of the case, it also considered the arguments raised by the MRA in respect to the Supreme Court’s powers.

Great general and public importance

The MRA submitted that the case involved a question of great general or public importance, since the case concerned the powers and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to remit the matter to the ARC. The MRA’s central point was section 21 of the MRA Act is limited to the prosecution of an appeal rather than how an appeal is to be determined.

In support of this, the MRA compared section 21 of the MRA Act to section 96 of the District and Intermediate Courts (Criminal Jurisdiction) Act, section 6 of the Criminal Appeal Act and section 9 of the Court of Civil Appeal Act which confer through statute the powers and jurisdiction of the appellate court upon hearing an appeal.

Given that this line of argument was only raised on the day of the hearing, and in which learned counsel for the MRA conceded was not part of the grounds of appeal, the Supreme Court did not address these submissions directly but deemed it fit to reproduce the arguments of the taxpayer as follows:

“b) the issue of whether the Supreme Court has power to remit a case back to the ARC has already been dealt with in the case of The Director General, Mauritius Revenue Authority v Vayres Investments Ltd & Anor [2025 SCJ 502];

c) “…the fact that section 21 of the MRA Act is silent on the powers of the Supreme Court in relation to an appeal by way of case stated does not strip the Supreme Court of the powers that the Constitution has expressly granted it”;

d) section 21 of the MRA Act must be interpreted in a way which is consonant with section 76(1) of the Constitution;

e) the reasoning of learned Counsel for the applicant with regard to section 21 of the MRA Act and rule 8 of the Appeal Rules, if accepted, would not only be contrary to the basic rules of statutory interpretation thereby defeating the intention of the legislator but will also lead to absurd results;

f) it would also imply that the legislator has failed to provide for an effective appeal system for taxpayers to appeal against decisions of a quasi-judicial body; and

g) the applicant is adopting a selective and inconsistent approach to section 21 of the MRA Act and rule 8 of the Appeal Rules viz. In similar previous cases, the applicant has not only submitted to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court but has also willingly accepted that cases be remitted back to the ARC for further consideration. Reference here was made to the case of The Director General, Mauritius Revenue Authority v The Assessment Review Committee and Noodle Express Ltd [2025 SCJ 498] in which case learned Counsel for the applicant appeared together with Mr N.S.K. Meetook, Senior State Counsel and expressly agreed to the Court’s suggestion that the case be remitted back to the ARC for further consideration.”

Analysis

The Judgment is a welcome relief to a number of taxpayers who have been subject to the same procedural objections raised before the ARC and the Supreme Court. The Supreme’s Court reiteration of the proceedings since their inception shows the length and breadth of the procedural battles faced by taxpayers, which in our view, have no raison d’être.

In so doing, the Judgment illustrates the hurdles which taxpayers face in seeking their right to justice and the cost and time implications that may result from resisting assessment issued by the MRA. We hope that changes brought by the Revenue Tribunal Act 2025 will curb such drawn-out litigations and that the merits of disputes are swiftly addressed.

The Judgment additionally reinforces the requirements test to be applied in Mauritius in applications for leave to appeal to the JCPC.